Agins v. City of Tiburon: An Aggrieved Party-Loss of Inverse Condemnation Actions in Zoning Ordinance Disputes by Luostari, Walter R.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 11
1-15-1980
Agins v. City of Tiburon: An Aggrieved Party-Loss
of Inverse Condemnation Actions in Zoning
Ordinance Disputes
Walter R. Luostari
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Remedies Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter R. Luostari Agins v. City of Tiburon: An Aggrieved Party-Loss of Inverse Condemnation Actions in Zoning Ordinance Disputes , 7
Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1980)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol7/iss2/11
Agins v. City of Tiburon: An Aggrieved Party-Loss
of Inverse Condemnation Actions in Zoning
Ordinance Disputes
This casenote provides a review of the California Supreme Court's most re-
cent reconciliation of the respective rights of individual landowners vis-a-
vis local government entity in the area of land use control. In this case, by
abolishing the availability of an action for inverse condemnation in con-
nection with a local zoning ordinance, the court has adopted an all-or-
nothing approach to the determination of the propriety of the legislative
action. The unfortunate result of the ruling is a severe curtailment of an
individual property owner's right to recoupment of lost value.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized that the government cannot "take"1 an in-
dividual's property without providing just compensation and due
process of law.2 Initially, this constitutional protection afforded
the industrious and the acquisitive a sense of security in that one
knew that whatever was acquired would remain so, and that even
if it were taken for a valid public purpose, it would be replaced
with just compensation by the appropriating authority. In recent
years, however, judicial interpretation and public need have given
birth to permutations of such terms as "take,"3 "just compensa-
tion,"4 and "due process," 5 such that it is apparent that property
1. "To appropriate for one's own or another's use or benefit .... THE AMER-
ICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1311 (1970).
2. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.; and, "[P]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation." CAL. CONST., art. I, § 19.
3. "[WJhen land use regulation results in a virtual prohibition on use so that
value of the property in question is substantially reduced, if not totally destroyed,
evidence exists that a taking has occurred." Trust of Three v. City of Emeryville,
430 F. Supp. 833, 840 (C.D. Cal. 1977). "Diminution of profits or a requirement that
some loss be suffered is not enough when all other accoutrements of ownership
remain, to be a 'taking'." South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 679 (1974).
4. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. And 'just compensation'
means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to
be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his
property had not been taken. In enforcing the Constitutional mandate,
the Court at an early date adopted the concept of market value: the own-
rights6 may very well have taken on a chameleon-like quality. As
between legitimate governmental needs 7 and the rights of land-
owners, it would seem that there is no pareto optimality,8 and
that the individual landowner, and not the public, will all too
often bear the greater share of the burden imposed by public
needs and purposes.9
It is the purpose of this casenote to discuss the remedies now
available in California to an aggrieved landowner who claims that
a particular zoning ordinance is unconstitutionally restrictive.
This discussion will particularly focus upon the effect on such
remedies by the recent California Supreme Court decision in
Agins v. City of Tiburon.O
er is entitled to the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking.
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1970).
5. "Due process of law does not consist of legislative legerdemain, but rather
is intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government-unrestrained by higher 'law of the land'." City of Cincinnati v. Bos-
sert Mach. Co., 43 Ohio Op. 2d 76, 78, 236 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1968). "Constitutional
Due Process is not a hard and fast legal concept. The standards to be applied
must necessarily conform to the concept of what is fair and reasonable." Osmond
v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1974).
6. "Property," in a legal sense, has been broadly defined. The United
States Supreme Court has said that the term "property" is not used in
"[the] vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to
which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law . . . [Instead it] de-
note [s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical
thing, as the right to possess, use and.dispose of it .. "
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28-29, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
375-76 (1979).
7. In Agins, the court recognized the power of the government to preserve
and improve the quality of life for its citizens by and through the regulation of the
use of private land, and that the constitutional rights of the individual landowner
must be balanced against the legitimate needs of the government. 24 Cal. 3d at
273, 598 P.2d at 28-29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76.
8. The term pareto optimality is used by economists and political theorists to
describe the situation, existing thus far in theory only, wherein two or more par-
ties are confronted with a continuum of options. The optimum choice, or solution
chosen would be that which involved no negative factors, i.e., the parties would
each acquire something without an attendant loss of some value to any other
party. This theory obtains its name and origin from the Italian economist, Vilfredo
Pareto.
9. We have said that the "underlying purpose of our constitutional provi-
sion in inverse-as well as ordinary-condemnation is to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the
making of the public improvements ... to socialize the burden ... to af-
ford relief to the landowner in cases in which it is unfair to ask him to
bear a burden that should be assumed by society ... (citations omitted).
Justice Clark, dissenting. 24 Cal. 3d at 266, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (cit-
ing Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 475 P.2d 441, 445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349
(1970)), Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979).
10. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). Immediately prior to
the publication of this article it was learned that Agins will be heard by the United
States Supreme Court in April of 1980. A reversal of Agin s by the Court would
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Prior to Agins, an aggrieved landowner could bring an action
against a public entity asking for a declaration that a zoning ordi-
nance, enacted pursuant to a particular land development plan be
declared unconstitutional and therefore void. Or, in the alterna-
tive, he could sue for damages in inverse condemnation. 1 Agins,
however, has now limited the remedies available and the extent
to which relief under them may be granted.
II. KLOPPING AND ELDRIDGE-PREDECESSORS TO AGINS
In Agins, two prior cases were explained, distinguished, and
perhaps, partially overruled. Those two cases were Klopping v.
City of Whittier12 and Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto.13
In Klopping, plaintiffs alleged that the city's actions, in an-
nouncing on two separate occasions its intent to condemn their
real property, were unreasonable and were performed, to some
extent, for the purpose of depressing the fair market value of the
land.14 This, plaintiffs claimed, constituted a de facto "taking" of
their property by the city. The California Supreme Court, in per-
tinent part, recognized that a de facto takingl5 (requiring compen-
sation by the public authority) may occur in cases involving
particularly harsh zoning regulations which are "calculatingly
designed to decrease any future condemnation award."'16
affect numerous recent California holdings. See, e.g., Furey v. City of Sacramento,
24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979); Briggs v. State of California ex
rel. Dep't of Parks and Recreation, 98 Cal. App. 3d 190, 159 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1979); Air
Quality Products, Inc. v. State of California, 96 Cal. App. 3d 340, 157 Cal. Rptr. 791
(1979); Viso v. State of California, 92 Cal. App. 3d 15, 154 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1979).
11. The term "inverse condemnation" describes a situation in which "property
has been taken by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but without any
payment of compensation having been made" by the appropriating authority.
State of California v. United States District Court, 213 F.2d 818, 821 n.10 (9th Cir.
1954). In an inverse condemnation action, the property owner must plead and
prove that there is an infringement of his property rights by the public entity, Peo-
ple v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 400, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (1943); and, there must be an
actual appropriation or impairment of a valuable property right by the public en-
tity, Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 190
Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
12. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
13. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
14. There were other issues involved in Kopping which are not pertinent to
this discussion and are not set forth.
15. "In de facto taking cases, the landowner claims that because of particu-
larly oppressive acts by the public authority the 'taking' actually has occurred ear-
lier than the date set by statute." 8 Cal. 3d 39, 46, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1, 7 (1972).
16. Id. 62, 500 P.2d at 68, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 23. See also, Turner v. County of Del
Eldridge involved a zoning ordinance which classified plaintiffs'
land as permanent open space and conservation lands. In es-
sence, plaintiffs complained that the city's ordinance denied them
of any reasonable or beneficial use of their land.'7 The city's de-
murrers were sustained without leave to amend by the trial court.
The court of appeal reversed.
The issue before the Eldridge court was the same as that posed
in the Agins case, that is, whether a landowner may sue in in-
verse condemnation where a zoning ordinance was so oppressive
as to constitute a taking of property. The Eldridge court decided
this issue in the affirmative,1 8 and further stated that whether the
ordinance constituted a "taking" was a question for the trier of
fact.19
Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 316, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (1972). The court in Turner held
that even if a zoning ordinance is found to constitute a valid exercise of the state
police power, the landowner would still be entitled to compensation if there was a
taking of the property.
17. Two separate and distinct actions were initiated at the trial court level.
The two plaintiffs were Eldridge and Beyer and the appeals were consolidated for
the purpose of appellate consideration.
Eldridge, in his complaint, only sought damages in inverse condemnation, while
Beyer, complained that the ordinances effectuated a taking of his property and
prayed for damages or alternatively, for a declaration that the ordinances were un-
constitutional and therefore void.
18. "[A] valid zoning ordinance may nevertheless operate so oppresively as to
amount to a taking, thus giving an aggrieved landowner a right to damages in in-
verse condemnation." (emphasis added). See note 13 supra, at 626 (petition for
hearing denied, July 15, 1976).
The Eldridge decision is supported by the same authority relied upon by the
Agins court in holding that no action in inverse condemnation would lie:
Not only is an actual physical appropriation, under an attempted exercise
of the police power, in practical effect an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, but if regulative legislation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as vir-
tually to deprive a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his prop-
erty, it comes within the purview of the law of eminent domain.
1 NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 116-21 (3d ed. 1975).
The Agins court reached the opposite conclusion of the Eldridge court by hing-
ing its argument on another statement by Nichols, supra, that "[SI uch legislation
is an invalid exercise of the police power since it is clearly unreasonable and arbi-
trary. It is invalid as an exercise of the power of eminent domain since no provi-
sion is made for compensation." 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 375 (1979).
To the extent that Eldridge held that such regulation gave rise to an action in
inverse condemnation, it was expressly disapproved by Agins. Id. at 272, 598 P.2d
at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
19. The Eldridge court stated that the question could not be decided as a mat-
ter of law, that is, at a hearing on a demurrer. The Agins court, however, upheld
the trial court's holding that as a matter of law, plaintiffs were not entitled to a
favorable judgment in declaratory relief. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
378.
It should be noted that, in Agins, plaintiffs claimed in their pleading papers that
the ordinance had completely destroyed the value of their property for any pur-
pose or use whatsoever.
A general demurrer will test the sufficiency of the pleading to state a cause of
[Vol. 7: 457, 1980] Agins v. City of Tiburon
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III AGINS-STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs, owners of five acres of unimproved land in the City of
Tiburon,20 brought suit against the city on a claim of inverse con-
demnation. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the city's zon-
ing ordinance was unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs' claim originated when the city, pursuant to California
Government Code section 65302(a), 2 1 undertook to develop a gen-
eral plan of land-use control. In January of 1972, the city acquired
the services of several expert consultants who were to make rec-
ommendations which would assist the city in preparing a general
plan of land development. These expert consultants subse-
quently submitted reports to the city which, in essence, recom-
mended that:
(1) Tiburon attempt to acquire most of Tiburon Ridge for open
'space; and,
(2) The purchase of open space lands be financed through the
issuance of general obligation bonds.
Tiburon subsequently passed Ordinance No. 124 N.S.22 Under
action, and all well pleaded facts will be deemed true for this limited purpose, but
this does not admit conclusions of law.
Furthermore, on a demurrer, the court may take judicial notice of any relevant
material, such as resolutions, reports and other official acts of the county or other
public entity. Pan Pacific Properties v. City of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 146
Cal. Rptr. 428, 432 (1978).
The Agins court took judicial notice of the City's Ordinance and concluded that
plaintiffs were left with a considerable amount of use of their property, despite
their allegations to the contrary. Therefore, the court concluded, as a matter of
law, that plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action entitling them to declara-
tory relief. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
20. The City of Tiburon will hereinafter be referred to as either "the city" or
"Tiburon."
21. The general plan shall consist of a statement of development policies
and shall include a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth objectives,
principles, standards, plan proposals. The plan shall include the following
elements:
(a) A land use element which designates the proposed general distri-
bution and general location and extent of the uses of the land for housing,
business, industry, open space ... and other categories of public and pri-
vate uses of land. The land use element shall include a statement of the
standards of population density and building intensity recommended for
the various districts and other territory covered by the plan. The land use
element shall also identify areas covered by the plan which are subject to
flooding and shall be reviewed annually with respect to such areas.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1979).
22. Tiburon City Ordinance No. 124 N.S. became effective on June 28, 1973. It
adopted widespread zoning modifications which utilized some of the expert con-
sultants' recommendations.
this ordinance, plaintiffs' land was designated RPD-1, a Residen-
tial Planned Development and Open Space Zone.23 Ordinance 124
N.S., as applied to plaintiffs' land, required plaintiffs to build a
minimum of one and no more than five dwelling units on their five
acres of land.24
On October 15, 1973, plaintiffs filed a claim25 against the city al-
leging that the value of their land had been completely destroyed
by the adoption of Ordinance No. 124 N.S. The city rejected plain-
tiffs' claim.
The city, on December 4, 1973, filed a complaint 26 in eminent do-
main 27 and subsequently, on November 1, 1974, filed a notice of
abandonment of the eminent domain proceeding. 28 The action
23. "The authorized uses of land so designated are (1) one-family dwellings,
(2) open space uses, and (3) accessory buildings and accessory uses." 24 Cal. 3d
266, 271, 598 P.2d 25, 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979).
24. Under the designation RPD-1, building density is restricted to not less
than .2 and not more than 1 dwelling unit per gross acre. Id.
25. The claim referred to is an administrative procedure, under which a public
entity is or may become a party defendant. Such a claim involves no judicial ac-
tion, but often is a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit against the entity.
This claims' procedure is governed by California Government Code, section 900.
The claims' procedure is for the purpose of providing notice to the public entity so
the entity may investigate the claim and have the opportunity to settle meritorious
claims and thereby avoid unnecessary lawsuits.
The inverse condemnation claims statute provides:
No claim is required to be filed to maintain an action against a public
entity for taking of, or damage to, private property pursuant to Section 19
of Article I of the California Constitution.
However, the board shall, in accordance with the provisions of this part,
process any claim which is filed against a public entity for the taking of, or
damage to, private property....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 905.1 (West Supp. 1979).
26. The eminent domain process is subject to the provision of the Code of
Civil Procedure section 1230.010. The rules of practice governing civil actions, un-
less provided otherwise, by statute, are generally the rules of practice in eminent
domain proceedings. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1230.040 (West Supp. 1979).
The proceeding is commenced by the public entity filing a complaint. CAL. CODE
OF CIrv. Paoc. § 1250.110 (West Supp. 1979).
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for
a proposed project only if all of the following are established:
(a) The public interest and necessity require the project.
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.
CAL. CODE OF Civ. PRoc. § 1240.030 (West Supp. 1979).
27. Eminent domain is "the right or power to take private property for public
use. It is an inherent and necessary attribute of sovereignty and exists indepen-
dently of constitutional provisions and is superior to all property rights." United
States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, 108 F. Supp. 454, 459 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
28. The notice of abandonment of the eminent domain proceeding was given
pursuant to CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 1255a (a) (West 1972). The trial court entered
its judgment of dismissal on May 20, 1975, and the city paid the plaintiffs the sum
of $4,500.00 pursuant to CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1255a (c) (West 1972). Section 1255
of the California Code of Civil Procedure was repealed in 1975. 24 Cal. 3d at 271,
598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (1979).
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was dismissed and on June 16, 1974 plaintiffs filed a complaint
against the city in the Superior Court, claiming, inter alia, that
Ordinance No. 124 N.S. was unconstitutional.
Defendant city's demurrer to the first cause of action 29 was sus-
tained without leave to amend and plaintiffs were granted ten
days to amend their second cause of action, which sought declara-
tory relief. Plaintiffs chose not to amend, dismissal of the action
followed, and plaintiffs appealed.3O
IV. THE REMEDY
Agins decided the question left unanswered in HFH, Ltd., v. Su-
perior Court,31 namely, whether vel non the landowner would be
entitled to compensation in the event a zoning ordinance prohib-
ited substantially all use of one's real property.3 2
The Agins court contended that policy considerations com-
pelled the conclusion that "inverse condemnation is an inappro-
priate and undesirable remedy in cases in which unconstitutional
CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1255a (a) and (c) read in pertinent part:
(a) Written Notice; Implied Abandonment
The plaintiff may abandon the proceeding at any time after the filing of
the complaint and before the expiration of 30 days after final judgment, by
serving on defendants and filing in court a written notice of such abandon-
ment....
(c) Judgment Dismissing Proceedings; Costs and Disbursements
Upon the denial of a motion to set aside such abandonment or, if no
such motion is filed, upon the expiration of the time for filing such a mo-
tion of any party, a judgment shall be entered dismissing the action and
awarding the defendants their recoverable costs and disbursements....
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1255a (West 1972). Section 1255a, subdivision (a) has been
superseded by sections 1268.020 and 1268.510(a); and, subdivision (c) by sections
1235.140, 1268.510(c) and 1268.610.
29. Plaintiffs' first cause of action was for damages claimed in inverse condem-
nation. 24 Cal. 3d at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (1979). See notes 11
and 25, supra, for the distinctions between eminent domain and inverse condem-
nation actions.
30. A dismissal of the complaint rightly follows a party's failure to amend after
a demurrer has been sustained. Rader v. Apple Valley Bldg. & Development Co.,
261 Cal. App. 2d 308, 68 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1978).
31. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1975). In HFH, Ltd., the court determined that inverse condemnation is not avail-
able to an aggrieved landowner who alleges that a zoning action merely reduced
the market value of his property.
32. In HFH, Ltd., we specifically noted that 'This case does not present,
and we therefore do not decide the question of entitlement to compensa-
tion in the event a zoning regulation forbade substantially all use of the
land in question. We leave the question for another day.' (citations omit-
ted).
regulation is alleged."33
Plaintiffs' chief argument was that the ordinance had imposed
such limitations upon the use of their property that an unconsti-
tutional "taking" had occurred.34 However, this argument was
dismissed by the Agins court, which relied upon State of Califor-
nia v. Superior Court35 and which essentially adopted the argu-
ment of various commentators 36 in holding that plaintiffs' sole
remedy was a declaratory action, or mandamus, 37 rather than an
33. 24 Cal. 3d at 274, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (1979).
34. Plaintiffs contend that the limitations on the use of their land imposed
by the ordinance constitute an unconstitutional 'taking of [plaintiffs']
property without payment of just compensation' for which an action in in-
verse condemnation will lie. Inherent in the contention is the argument
that a local entity's exercise of its police power which, in a given case, may
exceed constitutional limits is equivalent to the lawful taking of property
by eminent domain thereby necessitating the payment of compensation.
Id. at 272, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
35. 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
36. 1 NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1975); Fulham & Scharf, Inverse Con-
demnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974); Hall, Eldridge v. Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction
In Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 1569 (1977).
37. A plaintiff, in attacking a zoning ordinance, may attack the ordinance on
the grounds that it is uncontitutional, and that if not unconstitutional, it is uncon-
stitutional as applied to plaintiff.
In the first instance, the court may hold that the zoning ordinance is unconstitu-
tional per se. That is, the wisdom of enacting a particular ordinance is not before
the court. If there is any reasonable justification in passing the ordinance, the
court will not, and cannot, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. If
there is a rational basis or if the facts of any given case indicate that the reasona-
bleness of the ordinance is debatable, the courts may not disturb the legislative
determination. See Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 460, 327
P.2d 10, 15 (1958).
Mandamus, on the other hand, would lie where the public entity is claimed to
have exercised its police power beyond its constitutional limits. O'Hagen v. Board
of Zoning Adjustment, City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal. App. 3d 163, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1971). See California Civil Procedure Code Sections 1085 and 1094.5 for the re-
view procedures. Mandamus, however, will lie only when a ministerial act is in-
volved. If an authority may choose between two reasonable alternatives, (i.e.,
exercise of discretion) mandamus will not lie. For example, if there is a constitu-
tionally valid scheme of zoning, the courts may still properly inquire as to whether
the scheme of classification districting has been applied "fairly and impartially."
Reynolds v. Barret, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 32 (1938). The city or other public entity
cannot create an "island" when no rational reason exists for the classification. For
example, one lot as residential in the midst of an area zoned as a business district
is discriminatory and invalid. This is commonly known as "spot zoning." See, e.g.,
Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958), and Reyn-
olds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 251, 83 A.2d 29, 33 (1938).
Where it is claimed that a zoning ordinance is unreasonable, or discriminatory,
as applied to a particular parcel of land, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to produce
sufficient evidence that will justify the court in concluding, as a matter of law, that
the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid. Sladovich v. County of Fresno, 158 Cal.
App. 2d 230, 239, 322 P.2d 565, 570 (1958).
Where the authority of the public entity is exercised pursuant to its police
power of eminent domain, and that authority is valid constitutionally, a landowner
may still sue in inverse condemnation if the police power authorized by statute is
[Vol. 7: 457, 1980] Agins v. City of Tiburon
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action for damages in inverse condemnation.
Previously, in HFH, Ltd., the court had held that inverse con-
demnation "does not lie in zoning actions in which the complaint
alleges the mere reduction of market value, and that a zoning ac-
tion which merely decreases the market value of property does
not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding uncompen-
sated taking or damaging of property."38
In the instant case, however, more was involved than mere dim-
inution in market value. Plaintiffs claimed that the zoning ordi-
nance deprived them of all use of their property.3 9 Essentially,
plaintiffs' argument, in seeking compensation for the alleged tak-
ing by legislation was that if a state or local entity, in exercising
its police power, exceeded the constitutional limitations imposeil
upon that power, it was tantamount to the taking of property by
eminent domain.4 0 Were plaintiffs' argument accepted, reasoned
the Agins court, an aggrieved landowner could "transmute an ex-
cessive use of the police power into a lawful taking"4 1 merely by
bringing an action in inverse condemnation-in effect legislating a
result which the elected officials could not.42
The Agins court was concerned not only with the possibility of
private action validating excessive police action, but also with the
probability that by forcing compensation, the judiciary would
"chill" the use of the state police power in bringing about a de-
sired social end.43 The court recognized that state and local enti-
ties have legitimate interests in providing for systematic and
not exceeded and a compensable taking has occurred. See notes 25 and 26, supra.
However, inverse condemnation does not lie when plaintiff claims that the state or
local entity has "taken" his property through restrictive regulations, i.e., via zon-
ing. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377
(1979).
38. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975).
39. Justice Clark, in his dissent stated that the plaintiffs had alleged that the
ordinance destroyed completely, "the value (of their property) for any purpose or
use whatsoever." The city had evidently admitted this fact through the demurrer.
40. 24 Cal. 3d at 279, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (1979).
41. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
42. Id.
43. But note the legislature's own admonition:
The legislature hereby ... declares that this article [Open-Space Zoning]
is not intended and shall not be construed, as authorizing the city ... to
exercise its power to adopt ... an open space zoning ordinance in a man-
ner which will . . . damage private property for public use without the
payment of just compensation therefor.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65912 (West Supp. 1979).
orderly growth, and that land-use planning was very efficacious
in effectuating that goal.44 In balancing the protected constitu-
tional property rights of the individual against possible encroach-
ments upon those rights by the state's exercise of its police
power, the court held that the judicial control of the legislative ex-
cesses is to be limited to invalidation of the particular legislative
action,45 at least in situations concerning the application of a zon-
ing scheme. "[T]he need for preserving a degree of freedom in
the land-use planning function and the inhibiting financial force
which inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy persuade us
that on balance mandamus or declaratory relief rather than in-
verse condemnation is the appropriate relief under the circum-
stances ... "46
Analysis of Agins indicates that, henceforth in California, an in-
verse condemnation claim is no longer available as a remedy
where it is alleged that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional be-
cause it constitutes a taking without just compensation. The sole
remedies now available are declaratory relief and mandamus. A
close scrutiny, respecting the applicability of these two remedies,
reveals that the Agins court has left the aggrieved landowner
without adequate redress in the name of social development.
V. THE EXTENT OF THE REMEDIES
As a result of Agins, the remedies available to a party aggrieved
by a particular zoning ordinance are not only limited in number,
but in extent of their application. Recognizing current social val-
ues, 47 the Agins court reiterated the position taken in HFH, Ltd.,
that an ordinance which, on its face results in a mere diminution
in property value is not unconstitutional per se.48 In HFH, Ltd.,49
44. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979).
45. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The court stated that if the
remedy of inverse condemnation were available to the aggrieved landowner in
such a situation, it would threaten legislative control over appropiate land-use de-
velopment.
It has been noted that 'he weighing of costs and benefits is essentially a
legislative process. In enacting a zoning ordinance, the legislative body
assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that compensa-
tion will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance. De-
termining that a particular land-use control requires compensation is an
appropriate function of the judiciary, whose function includes protection
of individuals against excesses of government. But it seems a usurpation
of legislative power for a court to force compensation. Invalidation, rather
than forced compensation, would seem to be the more expedient means of
remedying legislative excesses.'
46. 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (1979).
47. Note 7, supra.
48. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975).
49. Id.
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the court refused to provide the aggrieved party with a remedy
where a change in zoning reduced the value of the property from
$400,000.00 to $75,000.00. This was viewed as a mere diminution in
property value.50
Citing Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co., v. Mahon,51
the Agins court recognized, as in HFH, Ltd., the practical truism
that individual property rights are subject to an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power.52 However, the Agins court
failed to recognize a necessary corollary to the above truism, i.e.,
that the police power may not be exercised beyond constitutional
limits. 53 The limits imposed upon the exercise of police power by
the invalidation of legislation, through Agins, is restricted to
those situations where the zoning ordinance will have the effect
of depriving the landowner of substantially all use of his prop-
erty.54
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Clark, the sole dissenter in Agins, summarized his
views by stating that, in California, "title to real property will no
longer be held in fee simple but rather in trust for whatever pur-
50. Many cases have been decided which have recognized and upheld the use
of state police power to effectuate land-use development; and, that organized com-
munity development is within the parameters of legitimate public purposes. See
e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (recognizing that aesthetic and
environmental well-being is as important, and therefore deserving of protection, as
is economic well-being); Bermann v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (within power of
legislature to determine that the community shall be beautiful, healthy, spacious,
clean, well-balanced and carefully patrolled); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 386-87 (1926) (recognizing additional restrictions with respect to the use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities).
51. 260 U.S. 395 (1922).
52. Justice Holmes stated that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power." Id. at 413.
53. See note 17, supra.
54. The Agins court stated that:
Accepting as we must the general proposition that whether a regulation is
excessive in any particular situation involves questions of degree, turning
on the individual facts of each case, we hold that a zoning ordinance may
be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its effect is to
deprive the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his property.
24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (1979). However, aggrieved
landowners may have a problem in stating a cause of action in that the court may
rule, as a matter of law, that no cause of action exists. See note 18, supra.
poses and uses a governmental agency exercising legislative
power elects, without compensation." 55
The practical effect of the Agins decision is that the aggrieved
landowner has a mere nominal remedy, which, in effect, is no
remedy at all. Just what constitutes substantially all use of one's
property is a question which has been left to future legislative or
judicial construction. It is apparent, however, that declaratory re-
lief provides little comfort to the aggrieved landowner for two rea-
sons. First, if there is any rational basis or reasonable
justification for a legislative determination regarding a particular
zoning action, the courts will not substitute their judgments for
that of the legislature's. Second, mandamus will lie only to com-
pel the commission of a ministerial duty. If there is any allow-
ance for the exercise of discretion in applying an ordinance to a
particular parcel of property, mandamus will not lie.56 In any
event, the plaintiff has the burden to produce sufficient evidence
that will justify the court in concluding that, as a matter of law,
the ordinance is unreasonable as applied to plaintiff's property
and is discriminatory as applied to him.
The pervasive trend of the courts in the area of land-use plan-
ning, as indicated by the line of decisions from Pennsylvania
Coal to Agins, has been to expand and to enlarge the parameters
within which the public entity, whether it be local or state, may
exercise its police power to promote the general public welfare.
The exercise of this expanded police power is now unhindered by
the concern for economic sanctions which might once have de-
terred overregulation.
WALTER R. LuosTARI
55. Id. at 282, 598 P.2d at 34, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
56. See note 37, supra. See also Jacobs v. State Board of Optometry, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 1022, 1034, 147 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1978).
